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RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENSES OF INSANITY AND IRRESISTIBLE
IMPULSE IN RELATION TO MURDER-BURDEN OF PRooF.--Defen-
dant, having vainly attempted a reconciliation with his estranged
wife, killed her by firing five bullets into her body at close range.
He was indicted for murder in the first degree. The defenses raised
were insanity and irresistible impulse. The first of the defendant's
expert medical witnesses testified to the effect that defendant had
been afflicted with the mental disorder of dementia praecox sixteen
years prior to the killing and had been deemed a psychopathic per-
sonality with a paranoid twist five years previous to the offense.1
The court admitted the testimony, over the objection of state's coun-
sel who alleged remoteness, pending proof of continuance of the
mental disorders to the date of the crime. The same witness tes-
tified that the defendant, one year subsequent to the killing, was
still afflicted with dementia praecox. The second of the defendant's
expert witnesses testified that the accused was capable of both de-
liberation and premeditation on the date of the crime, was able to
distinguish right from wrong, and was capable of understanding the
nature and quality of his acts. On the basis of this testimony the
previous testimony as to the mental condition of the defendant prior
and subsequent to the date of the crime was stricken from the record,
which determination defendant alleged to be error. Held, no error.
Since accused was capable of both deliberation and premeditation on
the date of the crime, as determined by the testimony of defendant's
second expert witness, was able to distinguish right from wrong,
and had the capacity to understand the nature and quality of his
acts, the testimony as to the mental condition of the defendant prior
and subsequent to the date of the crime was held to be immaterial.
The defense of irresistible impulse, a doctrine repudiated by the New
Jersey courts, 2 was rejected as a basis upon which to seek acquittal
on the ground of insanity. State v. Cordasco, - N. J. -, 66 A. 2d
27 (1949).
The word "insanity" as used in law very often has a varied con-
notation from that given to the word by the medical profession. A
person may be insane as the term is ordinarily understood and yet
may be criminally responsible for a particular act.3 Today the preva-
lent legal insanity test is the "right and wrong" rule, first introduced
as a result of M'Naghten's Case.4 The majority of American juris-
'Dementia praecox is precocious insanity usually beginning at puberty,
while paranoia is a form of insanity characterized by systematized delusions,
usually of persecution or grandeur, or tendency to form such delusions. Lee
v. United States, 91 F. 2d 326 (C. C. A. 5th 1937); HERZOG, MEDICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE §§ 613, 614, 615, 616, 617 (1931) (discussion of dementia praecox
and paranoia).
2 State v. Carrigan, 93 N. J. L. 268, 108 AtI. 315 (1919), aft'd, 94 N. J. L.
566, 111 Atl. 927 (1920) ; Genz v. State, 59 N. J. L. 488, 37 AtI. 69 (1897).
3 People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Gen. Sess. 1938).
4 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). M'Naghten had been
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dictions, including New York 5 and New Jersey, have adhered to
this test alone, while other jurisdictions, still adhering to the test,
have supplemented it with what is commonly designated as the doc-
trine of irresistible impulse.7 The doctrine of irresistible impulse
recognizes the existence of a mental disease affecting the volitional
powers of a human in such a manner that a person loses the capacity
of choice of action, while simultaneously retaining the ability to dis-
tinguish right from wrong.8 An enactment 9 of the New York
Legislature has impliedly 10 repudiated the doctrine, while the New
York courts have expressly rejected the doctrine. 1
In the principal case the court was clearly correct in its rulings
as to the substantive aspect of insanity and irresistible impulse, but
as to the procedural aspect (the turning point of the case) the court
was all too vague in that it did not clearly indicate that the testimony
of defendant's first witness was stricken on the basis of the failure
of the defendant to sustain a burden of proof imposed by that juris-
diction. The New Jersey courts have consistently held that the bur-
tried on a charge of murder. The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty on
the ground of insanity." Various questions were raised in the House of Lords
and then addressed to the Lord Justices. Lord Chief Justice Tindal responded:
.... to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."
5 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1120 provides: "... A person is not excused from
criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, or insane person, except upon
proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring
under such a defect of reason as: (1) Not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or (2) not to know that the act was wrong."
6 State v. George, 108 N. J. L. 508, 158 Atl. 509 (1932); State v. Noel,
102 N. J. L. 659, 133 AtI. 274 (1926); Machin v. State, 59 N. J. L. 495, 36
At. 1040 (1897) ; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196 (1846).
7 See Note, 70 A. L. R. 659 (1931).
8 Various examples of mental diseases included within the doctrine are:
kleptomania (morbid propensity to steal); pyromania (uncontrollable passion
for house burning) ; erotomania (excess of erotic desire). Neither moral in-
sanity (that state in which a person is morally depraved to the extent "that his
conscience ceases to control or influence his actions"), Bell v. State, 120 Ark.
530, 180 S. W. 186, 196 (1915); Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800, 141
S. W. 380 (1911), nor emotional insanity (passion or frenzy, being the direct
effects of anger and other emotions, and not the results of a diseased mind),
Wade v. State, 18 Ala. App. 322, 92 So. 97 (1921), rev'd on other grounds,
207 Ala. 241, 92 So. 104 (1922); Howard v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224,
5 S. W. 2d 1056 (1928), are recognized as valid defenses within the doctrine.
9 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 34 provides: "A morbid propensity to commit
prohibited acts, existing in the mind of a person who is not shown to have
been incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense
to a prosecution therefor."
10 People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 250, 6 N. E. 584, 590 (1886) (con-
struing N. Y. PENAL LAW § 34).
11 People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945 (1915); People v.
Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275 (1893) ; People v. Carpenter, supra note
10; People v. Flanagan, 52 N. Y. 467 (1873).
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den of proof is on the defendant to establish his insanity by a
preponderance of evidence.12 With this fact in view, it should be
noted that the second witness, who testified to the sanity of the de-
fendant, was the defendant's expert witness and that said witness
testified as to the mental condition of the accused on the date of the
crime. Thus, taking cognizance of the rule of burden of proof of
that jurisdiction and the conflicting testimony of the defendant's own
witnesses, the court does not appear to have erred in holding that the
defendant had not, as a matter of law, sustained the burden of proof
imposed upon him. The striking of the testimony of the first witness
was the equivalent of such a holding.
However, the striking of the testimony in the instant case would
constitute error in New York. In this jurisdiction the people must
prove the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt once
the defendant has put his sanity in issue.13 The stricken testimony
would have been sufficient to compel the prosecution to come for-
ward and prove the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt and would have raised an issue for the determination of the
jury.
C. F. McG.
CRIMINAL LAw-VOLUNTARY CONFESSION-INTOXICATION -
VALIDITY-QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY OR CoURT.-The prosecu-
tion obtained a conviction of manslaughter by using a confession
made by the defendant while intoxicated. The defendant appealed
on the ground that he was intoxicated to the point of mania I when
he made the confession and that, therefore, it was not freely and
voluntarily made as required by law.2  He also pleaded that it was
error for the trial judge to decide as a question of fact that the con-
fession was admissible and to allow the jury to weigh only the value
of the confession. Held, conviction sustained. Intoxication, at the
time a confession is made, unless it goes to the extent of mania, does
not affect its admissibility into evidence if it was otherwise voluntary.
Whether the confession was free and voluntary is a question for the
judge to decide. State v. Alexander, - La. -, 40 So. 2d 232
(1949).
12 State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d 197 (1945) ; State v. George,
supra note 6; State v. Overton, 85 N. J. L. 287, 88 Atl. 689 (1913) ; State v.
Maioni, 78 N. J. L. 339, 74 Atl. 526 (1909).
13 People v. Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 68 N. E. 359 (1903) ; People v. Egnor,
175 N. Y. 419, 67 N. E. 906 (1903) ; O'Connell v. People, 87 N. Y. 377 (1882)
(construing N. Y. PzNa.A LAW § 815).
1 "Mania a potu. Delirium tremens, or a species of temporary insanity
resulting as a secondary effect produced by the excessive and protracted in-
dulgence in intoxicating liquors." BLACK, LAW DicTIoNARY (3d ed. 1933).
2 State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329 (1898).
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